bill Biamonte, computer security, computerized voting, Constitution, democracy, doug kellner, Election Reform and Modernization Act, ERMA, HAVA, Help America Vote Act, lever voting machine, new york, news, politics, Privacy, rady ananda, scientific study, Technology, technology reports
July 21, 2008
SCIENTIFIC STUDIES, TESTIMONY & COMMENTS ON SOFTWARE DRIVEN VOTING SYSTEMS
Consulted in Preparation of Litigation
Appel, Andrew (Princeton University professor, Dept. of Computer Science). How I Bought Used Voting Machines on the Internet. Princeton University, February 8, 2007.
Burstein, Aaron, and Joseph Lorenzo Hall. Public Comment on the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, Version II (first round) Submitted to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. National Science Foundation ACCURATE (A Center for Correct, Usable, Reliable, Auditable, and Transparent Elections), May 5, 2008.
California Secretary of State. Top to Bottom Review (TTBR) of Voting Systems. As of July 16, 2008, all 14 TTBR reports linked here. 3May2012 UPDATED link: http://www.sos.ca.gov/voting-systems/oversight/top-to-bottom-review.htm (from which the following reports can be found; the following links are probably also no longer valid.)
— TTBR: Bishop, Matt. Overview of Red Team Reports. University of California, Davis, n.d. (July 2007).
— TTBR: Blaze, Matt, Arel Cordero, Sophie Engle, Chris Karlof, Naveen Sastry, Micah Sherr, Till Stegers, and Ka-Ping Ye. Source Code Review of the Sequoia Voting System. University of California, Berkeley, July 20, 2007.
— TTBR: Calandrino, Joseph A., Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman, David Wagner, Harlan Yu, and William P. Zeller.Source Code Review of the Diebold Voting System. University of California, Berkeley, July 20, 2007.
— TTBR: Inguva, Srinivas, Eric Rescorla, Hovav Shacham, and Dan S. Wallach.Source Code Review of the Hart InterCivic Voting System. University of California, Berkeley under contract to the California Secretary of State, Top to Bottom Review, July 20, 2007.
Compuware Corp. DRE Technical Security Assessment Report for Ohio. November 2003.
Epstein, Jeremy. Improving Kentucky’s Electronic Voting System Certifications. Letter to Kentucky Attorney General Greg Stumbo. September 28, 2007.
Feldman, Ariel J., J. Alex Halderman, and Edward W. Felten. Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine. Princeton University, Center for Information Technology Policy and Dept. of Computer Science, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, September 13, 2006.
Felten, Ed. Refuting Diebold’s Response. Freedom to Tinker, September 20, 2006.
Fischer, Eric A. CRS Report for Congress: Election Reform and Electronic Voting Systems (DREs): Analysis of Security Issues. Congressional Research Service, November 4, 2003.
Florida Dept. of State: Gainey, David, Michael Gerke, and Alec Yasinsac. Software Review and Security Analysis of the Diebold Voting Machine Software Supplemental Report. Florida State University, Security and Assurance in Information Technology Laboratory, August 10, 2007.
— Gardner, Ryan, Alec Yasinsac, Matt Bishop, Tadayoshi Kohno, Zachary Hartley, John Kerski, David Gainey, Ryan Waalega, Evan Hollander, and Michael Gerke. Software Review and Security Analysis of the Diebold Voting Machine Software. Florida State University, Security and Assurance in Information Technology Laboratory, July 27, 2007.
— Yasinsac, Alec, Mike Burmester, Breno de Medeiros, Matt Bishop, David Wagner, Ted Baker, Mike Shamos, and Gary Tyson. Software Review and Security Analysis of the ES&S iVotronic 22.214.171.124 Voting Machine Firmware. Florida State University, Security and Assurance in Information Technology Laboratory, February 23, 2007.
Gonggrijp, Rop, and Willem-Jan Hengeveld. Studying the Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B Voting Computer: A Computer Security Perspective. (Marketed in the U.S. as Liberty.) Presented August 6, 2007 at the USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop, Boston, Massachusetts.
Hertzberg, Steven. DRE Analysis for May 2006 Primary Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Election Science Institute, August 2006.
Harri Hursti. Security Alert: Critical Security Issues with Diebold Optical Scan Design. Black Box Voting, July 4, 2005.
Kiayias, Aggelos, Laurent Michel, Alexander Russell, Narasimha Shashidhar, Andrew See, Alexander Shvartsman, and Seda Davtyan. Tampering with Special Purpose Trusted Computing Devices: A Case Study in Optical Scan E-Voting. University of Connecticut Voting Technology Research Center, n.d. (2006).
Kiayias, A., L. Michel, A. Russell, and A. A. Shvartsman, with the assistance of S. Davtyan, A. See, and N. Shashidhar. Security Assessment of the Diebold TSx Voting Terminal, University of Connecticut Voting Technology Research Center, July 16, 2007.
Kiayias, A., L. Michel, A. Russell and A. A. Shvartsman, with the assistance of M. Korman, A. See, N. Shashidhar, and D. Walluck. Security Assessment of the Diebold Optical Scan Voting Terminal. University of Connecticut Voting Technology Research Center, October 30, 2006.
Kohno, Tadayoshi, Adam Stubblefied, Aviel D. Rubin, and Dan S. Wallach, Analysis of an Electronic Voting System, University of California San Diego, February 27, 2004.
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Requiring Software Independence in Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines 2007: Security and Transparency Subcommittee Recommendations for the Technical Guidelines Development Committee. November 2006.
Ohio Secretary of State. Project EVEREST (Evaluation and Validation of Election Related Equipment, Standards and Testing). As of July 16, 2008, all 13 EVEREST reports linked here.
— Press Release: Voting Systems Vulnerable. December 14, 2007.
— Project EVEREST: ES&S System Executive Summary Report. Microsolved, Inc., n.d. (December 2007).
— Project EVEREST: Premier, ES&S and Hart Testing: Project Executive Summary Report. Microsolved, Inc., n.d. (December 2007).
— Project EVEREST: Report of Findings: Risk Assessment Study of Ohio voting systems, Executive Report. Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner, December 14, 2007.
— Project EVEREST: Risk Assessment Study of Ohio Voting Systems Executive Summary. SysTest Labs, Inc., n.d. (December 2007).
Rubin, Avi (Professor of Computer Science at Johns Hopkins University). Secretary Bowen’s Clever Insight. Avi Rubin’s Blog, August 7, 2007.
Stratford-on-Avon District Council and Warwick District Council. Electoral Pilot Scheme Evaluation. The Electoral Commission of the United Kingdom, August 2007.
United States Commission on Federal Election Reform. Building Confidence in U.S. Elections. American University and Pew Charitable Trusts, September 2005.
United States Government Accountability Office. Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, But Key Activities Need to Be Completed, September 2005.
Wagner, David, David Jefferson, Matt Bishop, Chris Karlof, and Naveen Sastry. Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter. California Voting Systems Technology Assessment Advisory Board, February 14, 2006.
— Written Testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Committee on House Administration, July 19, 2006.
Wallach, Dan S. Testimony to National Institute of Standards and Technology and Election Assistance Commission Technical Guidelines Development Committee, September 20, 2004.
Wertheimer, Michael A. Trusted Agent Report: Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System.RABA Innovative Solution Cell on behalf of Maryland General Assembly Department of Legislative Services, Annapolis, Maryland, January 2004.
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